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BOOK REVIEWS

HOW INSIGHTFUL CAN THIS BE?
Campbell, Kurt M., and Michèle Flournoy et al. To Prevail: An American Strategy for the Campaign against
Terrorism. Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 2001. 416pp. $18.95

As death and taxes are inevitable to citizens of the United States, so also are the
contemporary strategic blueprints written after a crisis has occurred. In November 2001 the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, a Washington
think tank that focuses on national security, published To Prevail, offering a
comprehensive strategy to guide the Bush
administration’s “global war on terror.”
From inception to press, the book took
less than two months to complete. How
insightful can such an “instant” piece of
strategic reasoning really be? The answer
is “surprisingly so.”
To Prevail is a decidedly mixed bag of
facts, analysis, insight, and recommendations. For example, the chapter on the
Taliban appears quaint in light of very recent history (since November 2001).
Other chapters, especially those dealing
with military and economic issues, come
across as shallow and too general for real
utility. However, the overall conception
of the book and its on-the-mark chapters
dealing with intelligence, law enforcement, diplomacy, and foreign assistance
make this an invaluable guide to the
post-“9/11” national security world.
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Reflecting the mixed nature of the book
are findings and recommendations in the
closing chapter that call for applause but
lead to more questions. Meriting applause, the book’s recommendations reassert the need for engagement and an
active, focused diplomacy with the rest of
the world. Readers are reminded that the
United States must win this war with the
cooperation of a “coalition of coalitions”;
that the United States must win the information wars, not only in cyberspace
but in the international public forum of
debate (the press, television, and the Internet); and that it must pay attention to
coordinating its aid efforts to focus such
assistance so as to reinforce the public
message that the country wishes and
needs to send.
Also, To Prevail summarizes the intelligence needs for this conflict in ways that
are only now being discussed among executive and congressional decision makers. The authors point out the dangerous
parochialism within U.S. intelligence
agencies and the overwhelming need for
more and better human intelligence. This
is coupled with the authors’ argument for
expanded international engagement, for
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in the short term, other nations can
provide the human intelligence capabilities that the United States currently
lacks. Finally, the authors recognize
that local and state officials rather than
members of the federal government are
on the front lines in one major theater
of operations—the homeland. Consequently, the book recommends ways of
allowing decentralized coordination
among federal, state, and local authorities that maintain a balance between the
civil rights of the citizenry and the necessity of prosecuting a vigorous
campaign.
However, one must ask why—in light
of their insightful recognition for the
need for an integrated command, control, and coordination of an incredibly
diverse repertoire of efforts to fight the
war against terrorism—the authors refused to consider any real command
and control organization, process, system, or doctrine. In place of such a useful, even vital capability, To Prevail
merely calls for more commissions,
more coordination, and more openness,
and information sharing among existing agencies. The authors are Washington veterans who must know how naïve
their recommendations on this matter
sound. They recommend against forming a powerful department of homeland
security that would be capable of integrating the diverse and often contradictory and self-defeating efforts of a
variety of federal agencies. One never
really fully understands who or what
the authors are suggesting will conduct
the overall campaign planning and
oversight of the global war on terror.
The fact is that at this writing, it is still
not clear which federal entity is conducting the command and control functions
of much of the global campaign. This
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country learned quickly in World War
II that crises alone, even sneak attacks,
do not overcome bureaucratic turf
wars; the nation is relearning that lesson now. The authors must know this,
and they should propose an organizational framework to implement the
wide array of global and domestic measures advocated in their strategy.
To Prevail is for the serious strategic
thinker and decision maker. It is a commendable effort to bring together in
one place a comprehensive strategy that
can bring success in what promises to
be a long and unusual war. My only
quibble is the shortage of relevant citations, which is probably due to the
quickness of editing and publication.
Such is the price of currency.
JON CZARNECKI

Naval War College
Monterey Program

Baylis, John, et al., eds. Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies.
Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2002. 356pp.
$27.95

Although not recognized as an equal academic discipline by mainstream academics, the study of strategy has a long
and honorable history—the result of
numerous authors who, over the centuries, have developed their ideas and
placed their own imprints on the discipline. Since the beginning of the Cold
War, when the threat of nuclear destruction concentrated the minds of
scholars, the field shifted from traditional military concerns to the study of
nuclear deterrence. But now, more than
a decade beyond the end of the Cold
War, strategic studies return to their

2

